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The economics of optimal urban groundwater management
in southwestern USA
Jason K. Hansen
Abstract Groundwater serves as the primary water source
for approximately 80% of public water systems in the United
States, and for many more as a secondary source. Tradition-
ally management relies on groundwater to meet rising
demand by increasing supply, but climate uncertainty and
population growth require more judicious management to
achieve efficiency and sustainability. Over-pumping leads to
groundwater overdraft and jeopardizes the ability of future
users to depend on the resource. Optimal urban groundwater
pumping can play a role in solving this conundrum. This
paper investigates to what extent and under what circum-
stances controlled pumping improves social welfare. It
considers management in a hydro-economic framework
and finds the optimal pumping path and the optimal price
path. These allow for the identification of the social benefit
of controlled pumping, and the scarcity rent, which is one
tool to sustainably manage groundwater resources. The
model is numerically illustrated with a case study from
Albuquerque, NewMexico (USA). The Albuquerque results
indicate that, in the presence of strong demand growth,
controlled pumping improves social welfare by 22%,
extends use of the resource, and provides planners with a
mechanism to advance the economic sustainability of
groundwater.
Keywords Groundwater management . Urban
groundwater . Sustainability . Socio-economic
aspects . USA
Introduction
Groundwater serves as the primary water supply for more
than 80% of water systems in the United States (US
Environmental Protection Agency 1997) and, for many
more, it is a buffer in conjunctive use resource strategies
(Gibbons 1986; Koundouri 2004a; Olmstead 2010).
However, it faces intensifying stress due to changes in
climate, demographics and economics. Depending on
aquifer characteristics, groundwater can be an exhaustible
resource. However policy statements that advocate “sus-
tainable management” (Brookshire et al. 2002) rise out of
the same sclerotic management that meets demand growth
by supplying more water, not by signaling scarcity
(Gaudin 2006; Olmstead 2010). Management that simply
pumps more can lead to groundwater overdraft that creates
a negative externality. Current consumption jeopardizes
the ability of future users to depend on the resource. This
paper looks at one way to internalize this externality
through optimally controlled groundwater pumping.
Political rhetoric, cultural limitations and the rubric of
revenue neutrality have lead to supply-side management as
the default to meet new demand. However, a growing
society in an arid environment needs water policy that
internalizes the overdraft externality and advocates sustain-
ability. Controlling urban groundwater pumping optimally
leads to a dynamic and economic balance of benefits and
costs across users over time, and it gives policymakers a tool
for leaving future users the option to be as well off as current
users. The paper’s central question asks the extent to which
the urban society is better off with controlled pumping and
the extent to which it promotes sustainability. It investigates
how much water controlled pumping saves by comparing
two management regimes.
This paper extends the Gisser and Sanchez (1980)
work by applying their framework to urban groundwater
management, applying a hydro-economic model similar to
the one in Gisser and Sanchez (1980), hereafter “the GS
paper”, but with demographic and economic character-
istics instead of agronomic characteristics. The model in
this research uses the competition vs. control framework
set out in the GS paper for analyzing optimal urban
groundwater pumping under nine possible future condi-
tions based on assumptions of recharge and demand
growth. The central contribution this paper provides to
the literature is applied theoretical analysis of controlled
urban groundwater management. The analysis herein
identifies how much better off society could be with
optimally managed groundwater. It does so by estimating
social welfare and optimal water prices.
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The next section motivates the need for such an
application to urban groundwater management in the
southwestern region of the United States (US), ‘the
Southwest’; the following section develops a theoretical
framework to compare optimally managed groundwater to
status-quo management. It uses Albuquerque, New Mexico,
discussed later, as a case to evaluate the hypothetical
regimes. Then the paper presents the empirical results and
discusses the implications. The final section summarizes
findings and conclusions, and suggests directions for further
groundwater management research.
Background
Few cities in the US, if any, face greater water scarcity
than those in the semi-arid Southwest (Fig. 1). Research
finds that temperatures across the US West increased
during the last century (Saunders et al. 2008), but
Southwestern temperatures increased during the last
decade (MacDonald 2010). This is consistent with find-
ings of more volatility in precipitation and with predic-
tions of a drier climate (Solomon 2007; Seager et al. 2007;
Barnett et al. 2008; Cayan et al. 2010; Woodhouse et al.
2010). In sum, these findings imply surface-water supply
shortages. While they are significant, and may be ominous
signs of twenty-first century drought, they are not
unprecedented. Droughts in the Southwest have been
much worse (Woodhouse et al. 2010). Climate change and
drought mean that southwesterners’ reliance on ground-
water will increase. Consequently, communities in arid
environments need effective groundwater policy that leads
to sustainability.
Meanwhile, population and income growth increases
water demand. The US Census Bureau predicts that
between 2000 and 2030 the population will grow in the
southern US by 43% and in the US West by as much as
46%, which will account for 29% of total forecasted US
growth (US Census Bureau 2009).The prediction fits with
the historical reality verified by the most recent census that
easterners generally head west. The 2010 US Census
found that populations in western cities grew faster than
eastern cities (US Census Bureau 2010). Quenching
growth’s thirst contributes to the challenge of water
scarcity; moreover, surface-water supplies are mostly used
up. Sabo et al. (2010) calculate that westerners have
appropriated 76% of stream flows and surface-water stress
occurs in 58% of the West. By comparison, 10% of the
eastern US faces water stress. Surface-water limitations
and growth realities mean two things: little surface water
exists for new population growth and over-appropriated
surface water leaves little room for variation due to
climate change. Climate change and population growth
thus portend greater stress on groundwater as demand
outpaces uncertain and over-appropriated surface-water
supplies.
Rising demand and increasingly uncertain surface
water imply that sustainability of desert dwelling residents
depends on judicious use of groundwater. But what does
sustainability mean? This paper focuses on Solow
sustainability where current users “have an obligation to
conduct ourselves so that we leave to the future the option
or the capacity to be as well off as we are” (Solow 1993,
Fig. 1 Map of the study area
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p. 181)—which is economic sustainability. This definition,
however, does not encompass other negative externalities
that result from groundwater overdraft. For example, the
hydrogeology of exhausting groundwater resources means
that adverse events result. Harou and Lund (2008)
describe these. Negative environmental externalities
emerge. The interaction of groundwater and surface water,
coupled with groundwater reduction, lead to reduced
stream flows, so that springs and wetlands dry up and
cause environmental damage. Land subsidence is another
problem-causing externality; it damages infrastructure and
leads to increased flooding. Additionally, groundwater
overdraft leads to poor water quality because it creates the
possibility for saline-water intrusion and the movement of
other contaminant plumes. A plethora of negative exter-
nalities accompany groundwater overdraft. This paper’s
focus targets one of these, the inability of future consumers
to use water depleted from resources today.
The decision maker’s (DM)’s task, in this paper, is to
sustain the economic well being of current and future
customers. Unabated, urban groundwater customers today
compete rather successfully against future customers for
use of the resource. Thus, the DM’s challenge is twofold:
the efficiency component internalizes the externality
mentioned earlier and balances customers’ consumption
benefits and costs across time; the sustainability compo-
nent leaves future users the capacity to be as well off as
present users. The paper models the DM’s efficiency
challenge then looks at how collecting the scarcity rent
and controlled pumping, tools a DM could use, lead to
economic sustainability. By evaluating these policy tools
in tandem, the paper demonstrates the ineptitude of prices
that do not signal scarcity nor promote sustainability.
Historically, institutional and other barriers prevent
managers from collecting the water-scarcity value (Young
1986), which leads to the preponderance of revenue
neutrality in water utilities and pricing that does not
recover scarcity costs (Griffin 2001). Inequity concerns on
low-income users, and cultural beliefs that water is a basic
need for human life, and should not be priced as a
commodity in the market act as barriers to collecting the
scarcity value (Griffin 2001; Jordan 1999; Martin et al.
1984). Notwithstanding these barriers, this paper shows
the extent to which optimal allocation solves the DM’s
challenge across the management horizon.
Specifically, the paper examines optimal urban ground-
water pumping from an unconfined, exhaustible aquifer.
Previous studies that considered optimal pumping focused
on common-pool externalities, which resulted from
increased pumping costs to irrigators who share the same
water source. Gisser and Sanchez (1980), in their seminal
work on groundwater management, concentrated on
economic, hydrologic and agronomic conditions and
compared impacts under competitive and regulated
groundwater pumping. They numerically analyzed theory
and found that no significant quantitative differences
emerged between competitive and controlled pumping.
Their result, known as the Gisser–Sanchez Effect (GSE),
is now a prevalent research inquiry in the groundwater
management literature. The robustness of GSE has been
tested repeatedly. Property rights (Provencher 1993;
Provencher and Burt 1994), stochastic processes
(Knapp and Olson 1995), non-stationary demand (Brill
and Burness 1994) and backstop technology (Koundouri
2000; Koundouri and Christou 2006) affect the extent to
which GSE persists. See Koundouri (2004a) and Koundouri
(2004b) for a thorough review of the groundwater manage-
ment literature that considers GSE. This paper’s question is
similar to the competition vs. control question in the GS
paper and the ensuing literature, yet the interpretation differs
since the application is to urbanites and not farmers.
Study of urban groundwater management squares
nicely with the competition vs. control framework. The
competitive solution of the farmer defined in the GS paper
is analogous to marginal cost pricing in urban groundwa-
ter policy, but few studies have looked at optimal urban
groundwater pumping in this framework. Holland and
Moore (2003) apply it to analyze the Central Arizona
Project. They find that if the state of Arizona had
optimally extracted groundwater, it would have delayed
the project for approximately 71 more years. Holland and
Moore note, as do others (Brookshire et al. 2002; Fisher et
al. 2002; Mansur and Olmstead 2007), how water prices
should accompany optimal extraction following a price
path that includes the scarcity value of water. Timmins
(2003) models a water planner’s decision and finds that
despite non-price demand-side management efforts (e.g.
rebates and education), significant demand reductions are
not likely unless accompanied by pricing austerity. The
few studies that estimate what efficient prices ought to be
found that water prices grounded in revenue neutrality are
significantly less than efficient (Martin et al. 1984;
Moncur and Pollock 1988; Ipe and Bhagwat 2002;
Holland and Moore 2003). To be sure, efficient water
prices are not a panacea to water challenges, but
inefficient prices imply inefficient pumping and thus
inefficient resource consumption.
Theory
The paper channels the perspective of an urban water
planner, or decision maker (DM). The DM could be either
a single individual or a collective decision-making body
(e.g. a water board). The DM’s role is to allocate
groundwater to the customer base over the time span of
the planning horizon T (years). The base includes all types
(municipal and domestic, industrial and institutional)
within the service area. Urban groundwater pumping, w
(t) (acre-feet ‘AF’), is the total amount of water the DM
supplies during any single year, t, where t ∈[0,T ] (1 acre
foot of water is the volume of water required to cover an
acre of land 1 foot in depth, i.e. 1 acre foot=325,851
gallons=1,233 m3), assuming no long-term surface stor-
age so that w(t) gets used within year t. This section
formalizes a metric to evaluate two policy alternatives,
and it presents a state equation that characterizes ground-
water supply. Then it develops the alternatives, optimal
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control urban groundwater management (OCM) and
status-quo management (SQM).
Net present value
The GS paper and other work, which test the GSE, model
the irrigator’s profit function. Unlike the irrigator defined
in the GS paper, the DM in this paper relies on net social
benefits V(w,H) to measure social welfare and evaluate
policy alternatives. The net present value of social benefits
(NPV) is everywhere differentiable in w(t) and the height
(elevation) of the water table, h(t), in feet above sea level
(FASL), such that Vw>0, VH>0, Vww<0 and VHH<0.
The DM measures social benefits using the notion of
consumers’ surplus, which depends on w(t) and the total
demand curve since it describes the relationship between





pðzÞdz 8 t ¼ 1; . . . ; T ; ð1Þ
where the integrand is the inverse form of the aggregate
water-demand curve in the service area that derives from
the standard form:
wðpÞ ¼ aedt þ bp ð2Þ
and a>0 and b<0. The paper follows Brill and Burness
(1994) to model non-stationary demand. The argument edt
increases demand at the rate d<0.
The DM measures the cost to pump and distribute
groundwater with a linear cost model adapted from the GS
paper:
Cðw;HÞ ¼ c1 0 SL HðtÞ½ wðtÞ þ c2wðtÞ; ð3Þ
where SL is the level of the land surface in FASL, c1>0 is
the per-unit pumping cost in dollars per AF per depth, and
c2>0 is the per unit transmission cost. Costs increase with
pumping and depth to water since water from greater
depths increases the DM’s energy demand. Expanded and
simplified, costs become:
Cðw;HÞ ¼ c0 þ c1HðtÞ þ c2½ wðtÞ; ð4Þ
where c0 ¼ c1 0SL and c1 ¼ c1 0 . Some researchers have
argued that this cost model underestimates actual pumping
costs due to groundwater-well hydraulics (Sloggett and
Mapp 1984; Brill and Burness 1994). Over time, and with
continued pumping from a single well, a cone of
depression emerges around the well and means that more
energy is required to pump water. The GS paper assumed
that the cone of depression that forms was negligible. This
research makes the assumption of the GS paper that the
cone of depression is negligible, due to the bathtub model
of the aquifer. Given the critique, a cautionary note
warrants revealing that the results from the numerical
model in the empirical section are underestimates.
NPV serves as the decision rule by which to evaluate
management alternatives.
Hydrology
This paper, as do many others in this type of literature,
uses the state equation from the GS paper to model
groundwater from a single-cell unconfined aquifer like a
bathtub. The singe-cell aquifer means that this analysis is
confined to primary users of the aquifer and is analogous
to assuming that groundwater rights are completely
adjudicated. Externalities that accrue to users beyond
urbanites fall outside of the scope of this analysis. H(t)
measures the volume of water in the aquifer underlying
the geographic area of concern. The state equation
follows:
H
 ¼ Rþ a  1ð ÞwðtÞ
AS
: ð5Þ
Groundwater recharge, R (in constant and deterministic
AF), measures the amount of surface water that returns to
the water table. A flow coefficient, α (without units),
measures the fraction of w(t) that returns to the water table
where 0≤α≤1. AS represents the reservoir parameters. A is
the geographic study area of concern in acres that overlies the
aquifer. S is the specific yield coefficient (without units) that
measures the porous space where water exists below the
water table. The boundary conditions impose the restriction
that initial supply,H(0)=H0 (in FASL), exhausts whenH(T)=
Hx and the water table reaches the bottom of the non-
brackish, economically recoverable water supply.
Limitations exist in using this approach to model water
supply. Brozovic et al. (2006) find that researchers’ failure to
include spatial dynamics of groundwater into models for
policy analysis tends to underestimate impacts. This paper,
however, assumes H(t) measures the average height of the
water table underlying the geographic area of concern and
not the hydraulic head at a specific well site. This allows for
abstraction from well-specific groundwater dynamics to the
simplified bathtub model, but cautions that the results in the
numerical section may be underestimates.
Optimal urban groundwater management
Formally the DM’s problem is to maximize NPV subject






ert BðwÞ  Cðw;HÞ½ dt ð6Þ
and subject to the constraint:
H
 ¼ Rþ a1Þð ÞwðtÞAS
Hð0Þ ¼ H0; HðTÞ ¼ Hx and fixed;
where T is free and r is the social discount rate. Free
terminal time, T, allows the DM to end the management
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program when Eq. (6) is no longer maximized. The paper
imposes a terminal constraint on the stock, Hx, so that a
potential steady state in water table height does not result
at a hydrologically infeasible level (Brill and Burness
1994). This means that the DM chooses w(t) to maximize
NPV over the unconstrained planning horizon T until the
resource exhausts, which is to say the DM preserves the
potable groundwater supply for as long as economic
efficiency prevails.
An alternative approach, consistent with the strict
form of sustainability in Costanza and Daly (1992), is
to constrain w ¼ R= 1 að Þ, which preserves the water-
table height at H0 indefinitely. Although an interesting
question, strict sustainability is beyond the scope of
this paper.
In order to solve the dynamic optimization problem set
out in Eq. (6), apply the ‘maximum principle’ (Bellman
1957). The present-value Hamiltonian is:
H ¼ ert BðwÞ  Cðw;HÞ½  þ lðtÞ H ; ð7Þ
where lðtÞ ¼mðtÞert is the user cost or shadow value for a








edt  c0  c1HðtÞ  c2
 
þ








¼ H ¼ RðtÞ þ ða  1ÞwðtÞ
AS
; ð10Þ
where Eq. (8) is the dynamic optimization condition and:
lim
t!T
ertH H ;w; l;b½  ¼ 0 ð11Þ
is the transversality condition and vector b houses the
parameters in the optimization.
Optimal urban groundwater pumping results from the
time derivative of Eq. (8), substituting in the necessary
conditions, and solving for w

. The time path for optimal
urban groundwater management (OCM) results:
w
 ¼ rwðtÞ þ k1edt þ k2HðtÞ þ k3: ð12Þ
Equation (12) shows how OCM changes over time.
The coefficients are:
k1 ¼ aðd  rÞ; k2 ¼ rbc1; k3 ¼ bc1 RAS  br c0 þ c2ð Þ:
From k1, the growth parameter, d, positively relates to
w yet its impact reduces for r > d. Next, k2 shows that
depth to water inversely relates to w since b<0 and
c1<0. Lastly, k3 shows that recharge positively
relates to w. Equations (5), (9), and (12) compose
the system of differential equations that govern
optimal groundwater pumping and solve the DM’s
efficiency problem. These ensure that the DM uses
the resource in an optimal way and preserves it as
long as economic efficiency exists, which is until
exhaustion results. This differential system forms the
basis for the numerical model in the next section,
but first consider the implications of the necessary
conditions.
The costate variable in the DM’s maximization,
1 (t) in dollars per foot, is the shadow value for a
foot of water-table height. At the optimal solution to
the problem, 1 (t) is the marginal change in the
objective function, Eq. (6), by relaxing the constraint,
Eq. (8), by one unit (Lyon 1999). 1 (t) is the
marginal value of the increase in height, and it is
the marginal cost of height decrease. This means that,
if the DM could purchase water-table height, 1 (t) is
the DM’s maximum willingness-to-pay for it. Rear-
rangement of Eq. (8) finds 1 (t)>0 and Eq. (9) shows
l < 0. These conditions imply that the present
marginal value of the resource decreases with pump-
ing. Water at greater depths costs more to extract
than water near the surface. At the terminal time,
1 (T)>0 means either the DM has exhausted the
resource or that, relative to demand, further extraction
is too costly and the resource that remains is no
longer economically viable.
Scarcity exists when, relative to demand, supply is low.
In urban groundwater management, the shadow value
plays a crucial role in adapting to scarcity. Its role is to
ration resource use across time (Lyon 1999). In this
framework, 1 (t) rations water consumption as the scarcity
rent in Eq. (8) because it signals scarcity. Rearranging
Eq. (8) yields the role of the scarcity rent, which is the
marginal user cost (MUC) in dollars per AF, in optimal
pricing:
P ¼ MC þMUC: ð13Þ
H e r e P ¼ ab edt  1bwðtÞ; MC ¼ c0 þ c1HðtÞ þ c1
and MUC ¼ ertlðtÞ a1AS . When OCM is in place,
Eq. (13) shows that price should increase by the factor
MUC. It is the current value of the scarcity rent on an
acre-foot of water pumped from the aquifer. MUC signals
groundwater scarcity and efficiently allocates the resource
across users in time. The policy implication of Eq. (13) is
clear: if MUC is part of prices where efficiency results,
then its absence means inefficient pumping. The paper
now considers status-quo management where P=MC
prevails.
Status-quo management
Urban water policy is well grounded in accounting, rather
than economic convention, because revenue neutrality
(8)
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tends to dominate decision-making (Griffin 2001). Given
political and other barriers noted earlier, policy that is
revenue neutral constrains the DM to collect a price that
recovers transmission and distribution costs, not scarcity
costs. The constraint on scarcity costs further constrains
the DM to periodic planning as opposed to planning over
the time horizon. To contrast long-term and integrated
decision-making, status-quo management (SQM) restricts
MUC and inefficient water-pumping results. Without
considering all pumping costs to include scarcity costs,
revenue neutrality means a myopic policy that is neither
efficient nor sustainable. Thus, the paper evaluates SQM
to inform the analysis on the potential of OCM to better
and more efficiently allocate water and promote
sustainability.
This paper models SQM impacts with marginal cost
pricing, P=MC, and the following pumping path and state
equation result:
wðtÞ ¼ aedt þ b c0 þ c1HðtÞ þ c2½ ; ð14Þ
H
 ¼ Rþ ða  1Þ ae




In practice the DM may implement a menu of price
regimes based on user type. In this model, interpret P as
average revenue collected from all user types.
Numerical model
The previous section set out the theoretical differences
between OCM and SQM. Earlier, the paper discussed
political and other barriers that generally prevent con-
trolled pumping. It suggested why revenue neutrality
dominates water policy decision-making. In this section,
the paper presents the parameters the numerical model
requires to compare OCM to SQM using Mathematica
version 8.0. The parameters derive from data pertinent to
the case study, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
OCM shows groundwater pumping over the planning
horizon when resource availability constrains NPV. SQM
shows unconstrained groundwater pumping. The distinc-
tion between the two regimes is a difference in a long-
term integrated approach vs. myopic decision-making.
The paper makes the comparison to identify how revenue
neutral policy, in the presence of demand growth, affects
groundwater resources. Growing cities in the Southwest
face the reality of providing more people with less water.
Imposing SQM and OCM on Albuquerque data generates
hypothetical results. However, the results elucidate the
inability of SQM, relative to OCM, to mitigate ground-
water overdraft and to promote economically sustainable
groundwater use. The analysis evaluates the regimes
under nine possible future conditions based on population
growth and groundwater recharge.
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Albuquerque is a vibrant city in the Southwest that serves
as an illuminating example to compare OCM and SQM.
Like many Southwest cities, the city population bur-
geoned over the last century from approximately 11,000
people in 1910 to 530,000 today. Over the last decade it
grew by roughly 18% (Bureau of Business & Economic
Research 2011). The purpose of using Albuquerque as a
case study is not to exactly approximate conditions of
other Southwest cities but to illustrate potential gains in
social welfare from OCM when demand grows and
groundwater is limited. Therefore, while quantitative
model results would vary based on case study selection,
qualitative case study results for the city approximate the
effects of OCM.
The city rests in the valley between the Sandia
Mountains and the West Mesa, bisected by the Rio
Grande River, and in the Rio Grande–Albuquerque basin,
identified by the US Geological Survey (USGS) as Basin
13020203. The city itself encompasses an area of
approximately 200 square miles (518 km2; Earp et al.
2006) while the basin occupies 3,154 square miles
(8,169 km2; Flint and Flint 2007). The geographic
distinction is important due to data availability. The model
is at the level of the city yet some of the data are at the
level of the basin.
The next section discusses adjustments to apply basin
level data to the management problem at the city level.
The second important note is that the model does not
explicitly account for river effects. This means that the
model does not account for changes in social welfare that
result from changes in river flows that potentially
accompany groundwater changes. Koundouri (2004a)
points this out as a shortcoming of the GS framework.
This paper, however, implicitly adjusts for conjunctive
management in how it deals with the San Juan-Chama
Drinking Water Project (SJC) in Albuquerque.
Albuquerque water planners adopted an aggressive
approach to sure up water supplies. Recent elements of the
Albuquerque water portfolio include SJC, aquifer storage
and recovery, and water re-use. A thorough review of the
Albuquerque portfolio is beyond the scope of this paper,
but the piece relevant to this analysis pertains to the SJC.
See Flanigan and Haas (2008) for an in-depth discussion
of the SJC. New Mexico State Engineer Permit 4830
allows the city to supply consumptive use of 48,200 AF
(59.45 million m3) per year from surface water (Flanigan
and Haas 2008). The city finalized construction of the SJC
in December 2008 at which point it began to distribute
surface water from the Rio Grande into the water supply.
The paper accounts for the SJC in how it estimates the
demand curve intercept parameter. The analysis subtracts
48,200 AF (59.45 million m3) from the computed
intercept term.
Parameters
The paper relies on a demand elasticity estimate from
Espey et al. (1997) and data from the Albuquerque
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Bernalillo County Water Utility Authority (Albuquerque
Bernalillo County Water Utility Authority 2005) to
estimate the water demand parameters in Table 1. Espey
et al. (1997) report a median water demand elasticity of –
0.51. From the financial statements in the city data, the
paper estimates the average water price as the quotient of
“charges for services” and “annual pumpage billed.”
Using the Espey et al. elasticity and the computed average
price and quantity data from the city (1997), the numerical
model uses the estimated demand intercept and slope
parameters in Table 1. Note that if the paper did not adjust
for SJC, then a=135,179 AF (166.74 million m3). See the
Appendix for detailed calculations.
Recall from the previous section, Theory, that demand
grows over time at the rate d. It grows due to more income
and more customers in the service area. However, d could
be reduced by the non-price demand-side management
efforts the DM employs (e.g. rebate or education
programs; Renwick and Archibald 1998; Renwick and
Green 2000). The data show that city planners estimate d
at 1% for long-term planning purposes, a rate less than
population growth rate. Albuquerque planners have
adopted education and rebate programs to promote a
conservation ethic. Table 1, however, presents three
possibilities for d since they comprise uncertain future
conditions.
The cost parameters are derived from the city data and
a USGS groundwater-monitoring site. The bathtub ap-
proach to groundwater modeling means that the numerical
model needs a point where the difference between the
land-surface elevation and groundwater level is measur-
able. SL in Table 1 records the surface elevation of the
land at a USGS site near the middle of the city, at USGS
monitoring site 35082410637530. To compute per unit
pumping costs from the city data the analysis divides the
quotient of “utilities” and “actual pumpage” by depth to
water SLH0ð Þ. Per unit operations and maintenance
(O&M) costs results from the quotient of “operations and
maintenance” (less “utilities”) and “actual pumpage”. The
model uses the real discount rate shown in the table based
on Circular No. A-94 (US Office of Management and
Budget 2009).
Utilizing data and information from the extant literature
and the USGS, Table 1 presents the hydrologic parameters
that the numerical model employs. The initial height is the
measurement from the USGS site in 2004. The minimum
height stems from the simulation of groundwater flow in
the basin conducted in McAda and Barroll (2002). McAda
and Barroll show that water can be retrieved from greater
depths but that, presently, potable water is withdrawn from
depths above the minimum used here. The estimate for the
return flow coefficient is based on a seepage parameter
from the New Mexico Water Assembly (NM Middle Rio
Grande Water Assembly 1999) and conveyance loss
(Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Utility Authority
2005). Earp et al. (2006) identify the geographic area to
which the city provides service. Prior to 2004, the
Albuquerque water utility provided service to city resi-
dents only. Then the city and county water entities merged
to form the Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Utility
Authority (City of Albuquerque 2011). The paper uses the
storativity coefficient from McAda and Barroll.
The bathtub model from the previous section calls for a
groundwater recharge parameter. Table 1 shows three
potential levels for two reasons. First, variation in
recharge estimates exist in the four primary studies that
Table 1 Estimates of net present value and hydrologic parameters for Albuquerque, New Mexico
Net present value parameters Hydrologic parameters
Parameter Definition Value Parameter Definition Value
a Demand intercept 87,280a AFb A Albuquerque area 128,000 acres
107.66 M m3 518 km2
b Demand slope -32.43 AF2/$ S Aquifer storativity 0.2 unit less
-0.04 M m6 / $




Pumping cost 1.23d $/AF/ft H0 Initial height 4,915 FASL
0.0032 $/m3/m 1,498 m
c2 O and M less pumping 1,022 $/AF Hx Minimum height 3,200 FASL
0.83 $/m3 975 m
r Real discount rate 3 %/year
Future conditions, sensitivity test parameters
d Demand growth factor 0.5 %/year R Groundwater recharge 3,469 AF/year
4.28 M m3/year
1 %/year 6,112 AF/year
7.54 M m3/year
2 %/year 8,835 AF/year
10.9 M m3/year
a If not adjusted for SJC then a=135,179 AF
bAFacre-feet, 1 AF=325,851 gallons=1,233.48 m3
cM m3 million cubic meters
cFASLfeet above sea level
dMonetary units converted to 2004 dollars using CPI from the US BLS (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011)
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have measured recharge in the basin (in AF per year
[million m3]): Kernodle et al. (1995) estimate 139,338
(171.87); Tiedeman et al. (1998) estimate 124,254
(153.26); McAda and Barroll (2002) estimate 67,240
(82.93); and Plummer et al. (2004) estimate 54,713
(67.49). Given the variation in reported estimates and,
the second reason, uncertainty about future recharge, the
paper evaluates management regimes under three possible
future conditions for recharge. The estimates are the
minimum, mean, and maximum recharge estimates
reported in the four studies listed. The studies measure
these at the basin level but the analysis in this paper is at
the city level so the paper adjusts recharge based on the
ratio of city area to basin area. Using these parameters and
assumptions, the paper compares the results of the two
management regimes.
Results
The purpose of the paper is to examine the extent to which
OCM improves social welfare, measured by NPV, and
provides planners with a tool to ratchet consumer behavior
towards sustainable groundwater use. The results that
follow indicate three important findings: efficient manage-
ment reduces demand and promotes conservation, essen-
tially extending groundwater resource life; potential
welfare gains increase with demand growth; and optimal
water prices achieve the efficient management outcome by
balancing benefits and costs across users and time. This
section compares outcomes under OCM and SQM.
Models serve as a valuable tool to understand relation-
ships and to predict outcomes. The results that follow derive
from a model that seeks to internalize the externality of
foregone consumption placed on future users from ground-
water used today. The model does not internalize external-
ities the paper discussed earlier. This means that if the model
did include other externalities, it would produce different
results. Moreover, the nature of the cost component and the
bathtub approach to model the aquifer, together with the
recognition of externalities not modeled, imply that these
results are underestimates of actual groundwater outcomes.
Internalizing more externalities would lead to greater
reduction in use than the results that follow.
Comparison
The numerical model finds that OCM improves NPV yet
the magnitude of the improvements depends on assump-
tions about the future. Table 2 shows nine possible NPV
outcomes based on demand growth and groundwater
recharge. The outcomes show that OCM results are most
sensitive to growth and that NPV strongly increases with
the demand growth rate. Impacts mildly increase with
groundwater recharge. For low demand growth (d=0.5%),
across recharge assumptions, the gain is virtually nil. For
moderate growth (d=1%), NPV increases by 3% and for
high growth (d=2%) it increases by 22%.
Further, the model finds that OCM extends the useful
life of the resource but the length of the extension, too,
depends on future-condition assumptions. OCM does not
extend the resource life when growth is low, but for
moderate growth it extends the resource by 9% (20 years)
and 12% (17 years) when growth is high. That is to say
that in the case of moderate growth, the trigger point
where the water table reaches the bottom of the econom-
ically recoverable water supply is 222 years. For high
growth, the trigger point is 147 years. These points mean
that the DM could no longer deliver groundwater with the
same treatment technology as that during the planning
horizon since Hx measures the bottom of the potable water
supply.
Table 2 results derive from an urban application, not
agricultural, yet they are consistent with previous ground-
water-management studies from agricultural applications.
When demand growth is low, the GSE emerges, as the GS
paper found. Increasing marginal cost is sufficient to
mitigate over pumping when demand changes very little.
However, for the case of moderate growth, results are
consistent with Provencher (1993), Provencher and Burt
(1994), and Knapp and Olson (1995) who find that welfare
gains approximate 3%, 4% and 3%, respectively. When
growth is high, results are consistent with Brill and Burness
(1994) who compute gains of approximately 17%. Re-
charge affects the results but not as much as growth, which
is consistent with previous studies (Brill and Burness 1994;
Koundouri 2000; Burness and Brill 2001).
Figure 2 shows, for the case of moderate growth and
moderate recharge, what OCMmeans for the DM and for the
resource. In Fig. 2a, the wedge that emerges between the
plots shows how much less the DM pumps under OCM than
SQM. When demand increases and SQM prevails, the DM
supplies additional water by pumping more until demand is
satisfied at P=MC. It is the myopic strategy of pumping
more to maximize NPV by period. By contrast, OCM
maximizes NPVacross the planning horizon and not within a
single period. Figure 2b shows how OCM impacts the
resource. The wedge that appears shows that at the end of the
relevant planning horizon approximately 200 more feet
(61 m) of aquifer height remain under OCM than with SQM.
Table 2 NPV under SQM and OCM in billions of 2004 dollars for three cases of groundwater recharge, R, in AF/ year (M m3) and three
cases of demand growth, d
R=3,469 (4.28) R=6,112 (7.54) R=8,835 (10.9)
SQM OCM SQM OCM SQM OCM
d=0.5 % 2.36 2.37 2.38 2.38 2.39 2.39
d=1 % 5.43 5.60 5.47 5.63 5.49 5.65
d=2 % 22.50 27.44 22.53 27.48 22.57 27.52
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In the case of low growth, consistent with Table 2, the wedge
disappears, virtually no benefit gains under OCM, and the
aquifer height results at 4,200 FASL (1,280 m). The figure
does not display results for low and high growth, but in the
case of high growth the wedge returns although the water
table reaches the minimum level in 130 years under SQM
and 147 years under OCM.
The wedge means that people will use less water,
since under OCM, the DM provides a specific amount
each period. Table 3 shows what the wedge means in
terms of per capita consumption. The table presents
results when demand growth is 1% and population
growth is 1.8%. Over the last decade, the city grew at
1.8%/year (Bureau of Business and Economic Research
2011), and the city uses 1% to forecast future demand
(Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Utility Author-
ity 2005). These assumptions mean that current
Albuquerque policy limits demand growth to a rate
less than population growth.
In year 0, equivalently year 2004 of the city data,
the model shows that per capita consumption under
SQM is 95 gallons per person per day (GPCD;
360 L). This estimate is for pumped groundwater
and does not reflect the SJC netted out of the analysis
earlier. When added back in, the SQM estimate for
per capita consumption in 2004 is 183 GPCD (694 L),
approximately equal to the city data for 2004. The
estimates in Table 3 show that on a per capita basis
the optimal production path and the wedge from
Fig. 2 mean an 8% reduction in consumption initially,
but that the reduction increases to 26% by the end of
the horizon.
In terms of the size, the wedge means water
savings of 391,000 AF (482.3 million m3) over the
horizon. This size is roughly equivalent to 8 years of
the city’s permitted consumption of SJC surface water.
Further, suppose the city’s groundwater per capita
consumption rate was 50 GPCD (190 L). At 50 GPCD
(190 L), the wedge means groundwater supply for
nearly 70,000 people for 100 years. The value of the
wedge is the difference in the NPV under OCM and
SQM. From Table 2, the discounted present value of
the wedge is approximately 156 million dollars. This
means that the average present value net benefit per
unit of the wedge is 398 dollars per AF saved (0.32
dollars per m3).
Given the potential for underestimates noted earlier, the
results here should be interpreted as lower bounds of
actual OCM outcomes. The gains in NPV from OCM
under the future conditions listed in Table 2, and the size
and value of the wedge that results are underestimates of
likely outcomes of OCM. However, rising energy prices
could make a difference—increasing marginal cost miti-
gates demand on the aquifer and rising energy prices
could actually lead to lower demand for water.
Fig. 2 Estimates of Albuquerque a groundwater pumping in
thousands of acre-feet (AF), and b water-table height in feet above
sea level (FASL), under optimal control urban groundwater manage-
ment (OCM) and status-quo management (SQM) when d = 1% and R=
6,112 AF/year (7.54 M m3/year) [1 AF=1,233 m3; 1 ft=0.3 m]
Table 3 Estimated groundwater in gallons per capita per day (GPCD) (liters per person per day in brackets) when demand growth is 1%
and population growth is 1.8% for Albuquerque, New Mexico, over the planning horizon
Production in AF (M m3) Per capita in GPCD (L)
Year Population OCM SQM OCM SQM Reduction (%)
0 486,319 47,274 (58.31) 51,543 (63.58) 87 (329) 95 (360) 8
25 759,654 68,471 (84.46) 74,331 (91.69) 80 (303) 87 (329) 8
50 1,186,616 95,130 (117.34) 103,238 (127.34) 72 (273) 78 (295) 8
75 1,853,551 128,543 (158.56) 140,045 (172.74) 62 (235) 67 (254) 8
100 2,895,336 170,050 (209.75) 186,908 (230.55) 52 (197) 58 (220) 9
125 4,522,655 220,665 (272.19) 246,803 (304.43) 44 (167) 49 (185) 11
150 7,064,606 280,147 (345.56) 323,404 (398.91) 35 (132) 41 (155) 13
175 11,035,255 344,811 (425.32) 421,466 (519.87) 28 (106) 34 (129) 18
200 17,237,602 402,523 (496.50) 547,095 (674.83) 21 (79) 28 (106) 26
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Discussion
The results show that if the DM operates in an
environment of weak demand growth, then SQM serves
society as well as OCM; moreover, the GSE persists. On
the other hand, if the DM works where strong demand
growth exists, as in the case of the Southwest, then OCM
serves society better than SQM and the GSE disappears.
OCM is the efficient solution; it balances the benefits and
the costs over the planning horizon and describes the
optimal pumping level in each period. If in place, the next
question becomes how to allocate the optimal pumping
amount in each period. The DM could restrict by quota
the amount each user receives, or implement a system of
optimal prices and allow market forces to allocate water.
Economists have long argued that traditional water
prices are inefficient due to the absence of water’s scarcity
value (Hanke 1978; Martin et al. 1984; Griffin 2001;
Brookshire et al. 2002). Figure 3 shows, for the case
where growth and recharge are moderate, the efficient
price path that accompanies OCM—the Hotelling price
path for optimal resource extraction which derives from
Eq. (13) (Hotelling 1931). In the figure and the equation,
the per-unit water price is the sum of marginal cost (MC)
and marginal user cost (MUC). MUC, the shaded area
between Price (P) and MC, begins the planning horizon at
131 dollars per AF (0.11 dollars per m3) and rises at the
rate r to 4,766 dollars per AF (3.86 dollars per m3) by the
end of the horizon. This means that Albuquerque prices in
the year 2004 were approximately 10% less than the level
that signals scarcity. To compare, Moncur and Pollock
(1988) and Ipe and Bhagwat (2002) found that in Hawaii
and in Chicago (USA), the scarcity value was 303 dollars
per AF (0.25 dollars per m3) and 541 dollars per AF (0.44
dollars per m3), respectively. In 2004 dollars, the original
estimates were 0.58 and 1.58 dollars per 1,000 gallons.
The Consumer Price Index was used for monetary
conversions (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011). The
path in the Fig. 3 shows the price that the DM should
charge for water over the planning horizon to signal water
scarcity and to achieve OCM through the market
mechanism, which is the price that recovers the costs to
pump and to distribute water, and recovers the opportunity
cost of future users’ foregone use. The price path would
be a higher level if it internalized additional groundwater
overdraft externalities.
The paper mentioned earlier the political and other
institutions that restrict the DM to operate under revenue
neutrality, and trained customers to expect low water
prices. For example, Hansen and Chermak (2006) find that
across New Mexico, for a typical basket of utility
expenditures at the household level, the monthly water
bill is less than any other, including cable television. With
greater stress on water resources, customers and DMs will
have to think differently about water pricing. Pricing can
influence behavior to produce more efficient results.
Figure 3 shows that efficient prices to achieve OCM will
collect revenue. MUC signals scarcity by creating the
financial incentive for customers to voluntarily reduce
consumption. It also allows the DM to collect revenue
equal to the opportunity cost of future foregone use and to
internalize the scarcity externality. The revenue, through
wise financial management, leaves to future users a
monetary endowment and the option to be as well off as
current users; thus, the endowment achieves economic
sustainability. It is revenue that can be invested to find
alternative sources of supply through acquisition, invest-
ment in technology, or what future users deem valid
substitutes to foregone potable groundwater.
Prior research investigated the potential and success of
non-price demand-side management in promoting water
conservation (Renwick and Archibald 1998; Renwick and
Green 2000). This paper’s findings demonstrate that if
non-price efforts are successful at keeping demand nearly
stationary, then SQM serves as well as OCM in promoting
efficiency and sustainability. However, Timmins (2003)
Fig. 3 Estimated OCM price path and cost growth when d = 1% and R=6,112 AF/year (7.54 M m3). Rising MUC signals increasing
water scarcity
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finds that achieving long-term conservation with non-price
demand-side management warrants austere prices. Effi-
cient prices lead to efficient pumping and real long-term
water savings.
Efficient water prices are, by definition, efficient, not
equitable, which raises the concern for how the DM would
politically implement OCM via efficient water prices. The
analysis implies that OCM and efficient prices increase
future supply through foregone consumption. This is
compelling information for the DM to suggest changes
to the way political actors view water prices. Efficient
prices achieve efficient allocations and stimulate sustain-
able outcomes. Water prices are not the place to correct
income inequities; doing so damages efficiency and
conservation (Griffin 2001).
Summary, conclusions and extensions
This paper draws on the hydro-economic framework set
out in Gisser and Sanchez (1980) to model optimal urban
groundwater management (OCM). Its purpose is to
measure the extent and under what conditions OCM
improves social welfare and provides decision makers
(DM) with an approach to Solow sustainability of
groundwater. It compares OCM to status quo management
(SQM) that is rooted in pricing born from revenue
neutrality. The numerical model uses data from Albu-
querque, New Mexico, a city in the Southwest to estimate
management outcomes. The analysis finds that OCM
improves social welfare up to 22% and extends the life
of the resource up to 20 years. OCM yields the optimal
pumping path. The analysis uses it to compute the optimal
price path that includes the scarcity value of water. For
Albuquerque, the path indicates 2004 prices were 10%
less than the level that signals scarcity. This implies that
non-price, demand-side management policies in Albu-
querque have successfully reduced demand, but room for
improvement still exists.
The extent OCM improves social welfare and extends
resource life depends on assumptions about the future,
primarily about demand growth. The paper tests the
sensitivity of the numerical model to demand growth
and recharge. It estimates impacts for three cases of
demand growth and three cases of groundwater recharge.
For the case of low demand growth, OCM yields no
improvement over SQM and the Gisser-Sanchez effect
prevails. For the moderate and high growth cases, OCM
improves the net present value of benefits (NPV) and
preserves the resource. For the simulated case of moderate
growth, OCM preserves 391,000 AF (482.3 million m3),
roughly enough water for 70,000 people over 100 years.
OCM produces a 3% improvement in NPV for moderate
growth and a 22% improvement for high growth.
The paper shows how efficient water prices can be used
to achieve OCM. The DM can achieve OCM through
market forces using the optimal price path. Charging
prices along the optimal price path results in economic
efficiency over the planning horizon by optimally
allocating water across time periods and provides the
DM with a tool whereby to advance sustainability. For the
simulated case, the per-unit scarcity rent rises from 131
dollars per AF (0.11 dollars per m3) initially to 4,766
dollars per AF (3.86 dollars per m3) by the end of the
planning horizon. If the DM collects the scarcity rent, and
wisely invests it, future generations will have a financial
endowment that allows them the option to be as well off
as current generations. Future users can draw upon the
endowment to invest in alternative sources of water
supply. The DM can achieve the efficient water allocation
across the planning horizon and approach economic
groundwater sustainability.
The central contribution this paper provides to the
literature, and to the water-resource community, is the
numerical analysis of optimally controlled urban ground-
water management and optimal pricing. It motivates the
need to re-think the political rhetoric and other institutions
that prevent efficient management so that water pricing
approaches the optimal price path. The efficient water
allocation and sustainable financial reserve that optimal
pricing offers provide decision-makers with a solution to
increasing water demand and decreasing water supply.
The DM can achieve judicious and efficient water
management and simultaneously promote sustainability,
but it depends on the DM’s ability to use water’s scarcity
rent as a tool to do so. The paper finds that in an urban
setting, controlled pumping and optimal prices improve
social welfare and preserve the resource better than status-
quo management.
Three extensions to this paper will shed greater light on
urban groundwater management. OCM results are sensi-
tive to demand growth. A logical extension models the
optimality of the demand growth rate. Control over the
growth rate may allow the DM flexibility in choosing the
optimal pumping path and inform policy regarding urban
expansion given water availability. In this extension,
investigating the role of marginal user cost on demand
growth would be a worthwhile inquiry. The paper briefly
modeled conjunctive-use management by netting out SJC
from groundwater demand. Building in a surface-water
component to the model, and stochastically modeling
groundwater recharge would shed light on optimal
pumping in times of drought. Modeling the conjunctive
interaction would let the model capture environmental
externalities that the model in this paper does not. Finally,
regulation and other institutions need to adapt to allow
DMs to collect the scarcity rent so they can efficiently and
sustainably manage groundwater resources. Extending this
paper to investigate the best way to alter water policy will
further contribute to the discussion of optimal urban
groundwater management.
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Appendix
To estimate average revenue:
Average Revenue ¼ Charges for Services
Annual Pumpage Billed in AF
¼ $126; 622; 183
89; 721 AF
¼ $1; 411 per AF
To estimate the demand slope coefficient:
b ¼ " Annual Pumpage Billed
Average Revenue
 
¼ 0:51 89; 721 AF
$1; 411 per AF
 
¼ 32:43 AF2per $
To estimate the demand intercept term:
a ¼ Annual Pumpage Billed  b Average Revenue SJC
¼ 89; 721AF þ 32:43 AF2$ 1; 411 $AF
  48; 200 AF
¼ 87; 280 AF







¼ $7; 935; 163100;046AF
4;980FASL4;915:47 FASL
¼ $1:23per AFper FASL
To compute O and M costs less pumping:
c2 ¼ Operating Expense UtilitiesAnnual Actual Pumpage
¼ $110; 200; 502 $7; 935; 163
100; 046 AF
¼ $1; 022:19 per AF
References
Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Utility Authority (2005)
Comprehensive annual financial report: July 1, 2004 through
June 30, 2005. Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Utility
Authority, Albuquerque, NM
Barnett T, Pierce D, Hidalgo H, Bonfils C, Santer B, Das T et al
(2008) Human-induced changes in the hydrology of the western
United States. Science Mag 319:1080–1083
Bellman R (1957) Dynamic programming. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ
Brill T, Burness H (1994) Planning versus competitive rates of
groundwater pumping. Water Resour Res 30(6):1873–1880
Brookshire D, Burness H, Chermak J, Krause K (2002) Western
urban water demand. Nat Resour J 42(4):873–898
Brozovic N, Sunding D, Zilberman D (2006) Optimal management
of groundwater over space and time. In: Dinar A, Goetz RU,
Berga D (eds) Frontiers in water resource economics, vol 29.
Springer, Heidelberg, Germany, pp 109–135
Bureau of Business and Economic Research (2011) New Mexico
cities. In: Population estimates and projections. Available via
DIALOG. http://bber.unm.edu/demograp2.htm. Cited 22 Febru-
ary 2011
Burness H, Brill T (2001) Role for policy in common pool
groundwater use. Resource Energy Econ23(1):19–40
Cayan D, Das T, Pierce D, Barnett T, Tyree M, Gershunov A (2010)
Future dryness in the southwest US and the hydrology of the
early 21st century drought. Proc Nat Acad Sci USA 107
(50):21271–21276
City of Albuquerque (2011) Who manages Albuquerque’s water?
Available via DIALOG. www.cabq.gov/water/water-management.
Cited 16 November 2011
Costanza R, Daly H (1992) Natural capital and sustainable
development. Conserv Biol 6(1):37–46
Earp D, Postlehwait J, Witherspoon J (2006) Albuquerque’s
environmental story: educating for a sustainable community.
In: Albuquerque Official City Website. Available via DIA-
LOG. http://www.cabq.gov/aes/s5water.html. Cited 31 March
2009
Espey M, Espey J, Shaw W (1997) Price elasticity of residential
demand for water: a meta-analysis. Water Resour Res 33
(6):1369–1374
Fisher F, Arlosoroff S, Eckstein Z, Haddadin M, Hamati S, Huber-
Lee A et al (2002) Optimal water management and conflict
resolution: the Middle East Water Project. Water Resour Res 38
(11):1243
Flanigan K, Haas A (2008) The impact of full beneficial use of San
Juan-Chama Project Water by the City of Albuquerque on New
Mexico’s Rio Grande compact obligations. Nat Resour J
48:371–745
Flint L, Flint A (2007) Regional analysis of groundwater recharge,
In Stonestrom DA, J. Groundwater recharge in the arid and
semi-arid southwestern United States. US Geol Surv Prof Pap
29–59
Gaudin S (2006) Effect of price information on residential water
demand. Appl Econ 38(4):383–393
Gibbons D (1986) The economic value of water. Resources for the
Future, Washington, DC
Gisser M, Sanchez D (1980) Competition versus optimal control in
groundwater pumping. Water Resour Res 16(4):638–642
Griffin R (2001) Effective water pricing. J Am Water Resour Assoc
37(5):1335–1347
Hanke SH (1978) Pricing as a conservation tool: An economist’s
dream come true. In: Holtz D, Sebastian S (eds) Municipal
water systems: the challenge for urban resources management.
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN
Hansen J, Chermak J (2006) New Mexico water rates, expenditures,
and affordability. Report on file with New Mexico Office of the
State Engineer, Santa Fe
Harou JJ, Lund JR (2008) Ending groundwater overdraft in
hydrologic-economic systems. Hydrogeol J 16(6):1039–1055
Holland S, Moore M (2003) Cadillac Desert revisited: property
rights, public policy, and water-resource depletion. J Environ
Econ Manage 46(1):131–155
Hotelling H (1931) The economics of exhaustible resources. J Polit
Econ 39(2):137–75
Ipe V, Bhagwat S (2002) Chicago’s water market: dynamics of
demand, prices and scarcity rents. Appl Econ 34(17):2157–
2163
Jordan J (1999) Externalities, Water Prices, and Water Transfers. J
Am Water Resour Assoc 35(5):1007–1013
Kernodle J, McAda D, Thorn C (1995) Simulation of ground-water
flow in the Albuquerque Basin, central New Mexico, 1901–
1994, with projections to 2020. US Geol Surv Tech Water
Resour Invest Rep 94-4251, 114 pp
Knapp K, Olson L (1995) The economics of conjunctive ground-
water management with stochastic surface supplies. J Environ
Econ Manage 28(3):340–356
Koundouri P (2000) Three approaches to measuring natural
resource scarcity: theory and application to groundwater.
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
876
Hydrogeology Journal (2012) 20: 865–877 DOI 10.1007/s10040-012-0841-7
Koundouri P (2004a) Current issues in the economics of ground-
water resource management. J Econ Surv 18(5):703–740
Koundouri P (2004b) Potential for groundwater management:
Gisser-Sanchez effect reconsidered. Water Resour Res 40(6):
W06S16
Koundouri P, Christou C (2006) Dynamic adaptation to resource
scarcity and backstop availability: theory and application to
groundwater. Aust J Agric Resour Econ 50(2):227–245
Lyon K (1999) The costate variable in natural resource optimal
control problems. Nat Resour Model 12(4):413–426
MacDonald G (2010) Water, climate change, and sustainability in
the southwest. Proc Natl Acad Sci 107(50):21256–21262
Mansur E, Olmstead S (2007) The value of scarce water: measuring
the inefficiency of municipal regulations. NBERWorking Paper,
NBER, Cambridge, MA
Martin W, Ingram H, Laney N, Griffin A (1984) Saving water in a
desert city. Resources For the Future, Washington, DC
McAda D, Barroll P (2002) Simulation of ground-water flow in the
middle Rio Grande between Cochiti and San Acacia. US
Geological Survey, Albuquerque, NM
Moncur J, Pollock R (1988) Scarcity rents for water: a valuation and
pricing model. Land Econ 64(1):62–72
NM Middle Rio Grande Water Assembly (1999) Middle Rio
Grande Water Budget: where water comes from, goes, and
how much—averages for 1972–1997. Middle Rio Grande
Council of Governments, Albuquerque, NM
Olmstead S (2010) The economics of managing scarce water
resources. Rev Environ Econ Pol 4(2):179
Plummer L, Sanford W, Bexfield L, Anderholm S, Busenberg E,
Hogan J, et al (2004) Using geochemical data and aquifer
simulation to characterize recharge and groundwater flow in the
Middle Rio Grande Basin, New Mexico. In: Hogan J, Phillips F,
Scanlon B (eds) Groundwater recharge in a desert environment:
the southwestern United States. American Geophysical Union,
Washington, DC, pp 185–216
Provencher B (1993) A private property rights regime to replenish a
groundwater aquifer. Land Econ 69(4):325–340
Provencher B, Burt O (1994) A private property rights regime for
the commons: the case for groundwater. Am J Agric Econ 76
(4):875–888
Renwick M, Archibald S (1998) Demand side management policies
for residential water use: Who bears the conservation burden?
Land Econ 74:343–359
Renwick M, Green R (2000) Do residential water demand side
management policies measure up? An analysis of eight
California water agencies. J Environ Econ Manage 40(1):37–55
Sabo J, Sinha T, Bowling L, Schoups G, Wallender W, Campana M
et al (2010) Reclaiming freshwater sustainability in the Cadillac
Desert. Proc Natl Acad Sci 107(50):21263
Saunders S, Montgomery C, Easley T, Spencer T (2008) Hotter and
drier: the West’s changed climate. Rocky Mountain Climate
Organization, Louisville, CO
Seager R, Ting M, Held I, Kushnir Y, Lu J, Vecchi G et al (2007)
Model projections of an imminent transition to a more arid
climate in southwestern North America. Science Mag
316:1181–1184
Sloggett G, Mapp H (1984) An analysis of rising irrigation costs in
the Great Plains. Am Water Resour Assoc 20(2):229–233
Solomon S (2007) Climate Change 2007: the physical science basis:
contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK
Solow R (1993) Sustainability: an economist’s perspective. Eco-
nomics of the Environment: Selected Readings, vol 3, Norton,
New York, pp 179–187
Tiedeman C, Kernodle J, McAda D (1998) Application of
nonlinear-regression methods to a ground-water flow model of
the Albuquerque Basin, New Mexico. US Geol Surv Tech
Water Resour Invest Rep 98-4172, 90 pp
Timmins C (2003) Demand-side technology standards under
inefficient pricing regimes. Environ Resour Econ 26(1):107–
124
US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011) CPI inflation calculator. Available
via DIALOG. http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm.
Cited 20 Dec 2010
US Census Bureau (2009) U.S. population projections. Available
via DIALOG. www.census.gov/population/www/projections.
Cited 20 Dec 2010
US Census Bureau (2010) 2010 census data population change.
Available via DIALOG. http://2010.census.gov/2010census/
data/index.php. Cited 21 December 2010
USEPA (US Environmental Protection Agency) (1997) Community
water system survey, 1995. US Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC
US Office of Management and Budget (2009) Circular no. A-94:
guidelines and discount rates for benefit-cost analysis of federal
programs. US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC
Woodhouse C, Meko D, MacDonald G, Stahle D, Cook E (2010) A
1,200-year perspective on 21st century drought in southwestern
North America. Proc Natl Acad Sci 107(50):21283–21288
Young R (1986) Why are there so few transactions among water
users? Am J Agric Econ 68(5):1143–1151
877
Hydrogeology Journal (2012) 20: 865–877 DOI 10.1007/s10040-012-0841-7
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
